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COMMENTARY 
THE PROPOSED TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT: 
A BRIEF, SUPPORTIVE COMMENT 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the unratified Constitution of 1787 came before the state con-
ventions, one controversy more than any other nearly led to its rejec-
tion. The point of controversy concerned whether an additional effort 
should be made prior to ratification to incorporate an enumerated list 
of certain especially protected subjects into our fundamental law. In at 
least seven of the states, a significant number of people pressed the ap-
propriateness of such amendments. Essentially, their view was that cer-
tain matters were so frequently the object of recurring disregard that 
the Constitution itself should resolve the basic principles upon which 
they rested; although persons might subsequently disagree whether 
these principles would (or would not) permit a given kind of proposed 
law, it was important nonetheless to resolve at least the general princi-
ples against which proposed departures must carry the burden of ade-
quate explanation. 
In the first instance, the insistence upon these additions to the pro-
posed Constitution did not succeed. Rather, the prevailing sentiment at 
that time denied the need for such a special listing and asserted, more-
over, that efforts to add to the Constitution in this way were both un-
wise and impractical. In the Federalist Papers1 Alexander Hamilton 
observed that insofar as such a list could not be of indefinite length, it 
must perforce leave some things out of account. The result, he sug-
gested, would be confusing and misleading-an implication that any 
subject not specially listed would be deemed wholly unprotected de-
* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A., 1955, University of South-
ern California: J.D .• 1958. Stanford University. 
I. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton). See also the remarks of James Wilson in the 
Pennsylvania Convention. Ill M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 143-
44, 161-62 (1937). 
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spite the settled understanding that only such subjects as had been ex-
pressly committed to the federal government were to be within the 
national power. Against the practicality of the project, Hamilton also 
noted that however such a list might be drafted, the language of the 
draft would necessarily introduce uncertainties of its own-unavoida-
ble margins of substantial ambiguity that inevitably characterize any 
proviSIOn sufficiently succinct to include in a constitu-
tion-uncertainties leaving much to doubt and inviting future quarrels 
over interpretation that would be far better to avoid.2 
These "eminently sensible" arguments easily prevailed at the Phila-
delphia Convention, and the original Constitution was submitted to the 
state conventions essentially without a Bill of Rights.3 It came close to 
failure on that account, probably succeeding only because of repeated 
assurances that ratification would itself be quickly followed by prompt 
consideration of additional amendments,4 as indeed it was with the rat-
2. For example, Hamilton was unenthusiastic about any efforts to provide for the protection 
of a free press because: 
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave 
the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that 
its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, 
must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of 
the government. And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion, must we seek 
for the only solid basis of all our rights. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. at 514-15 (1961)) (footnote omitted). 
3. The Constitution was submitted "essentially" (rather than literally) without a Bill of 
Rights because, despite rejection in the Philadelphia Convention of efforts to secure a more com-
plete enumeration of particular rights, the original Constitution nonetheless did contain scattered 
provisions affirmatively safeguarding certain rights. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9 & 10 (forbid-
ding ex post facto laws or bills of attainder and securing the privilege of habeas corpus); U.S. 
CoNST. art. III, §§ 2 & 3 (securing a right to jury trial in certain cases and restricting the definition 
of treason); U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2 (interstate privileges and immunities clause); U.S. CoNsT. 
art. VI, cl. 3 (forbidding religious test oaths). 
4. Reference to the several volumes of J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CoNSTITUTION (2d ed., reprinted by Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co., 1974) confirm the sugges-
tion that in virtually every state for which there is any significant record of convention debate 
(e.g., Virginia, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland), the ab-
sence of an additional Bill of Rights was a principal source of consternation and hesitation. North 
Carolina declined to ratify until such time as some more satisfactory assurance was provided. 
Virginia narrowly divided, id. vol. 3, at 576, (in part bemused by an ambivalent letter from 
Thomas Jefferson in which he declared that ratification by nine state5 was es;ential to guarantee 
an effective union, and rejection by four states was essential to guarantee a Bill of Rights; the letter 
did not indicate in which column Virginia should place herself, id. at 573). Virtually all of the;e 
states asserted an expectation that additional rights would at once be guaranteed. Several states 
accompanied their resolutions of ratification with an express call for the proposal of such 
amendments. 
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ification of ten (of a proposed twelve) amendments completed in 1791. 
To a very considerable extent, some of Alexander Hamilton's criti-
dsms of those proposed additions to the Constitution have been en-
tirely fulfilled. The Bill of Rights is not a detailed code; most 
assuredly, the applicability of many of its provisions to particular laws 
or government practices has generated all manner of disagreement. 
Consider by way of but one example the first amendment provision 
that restricts Congress from making any law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," an amend-
ment subsequently deemed applicable to restrict the states by force of 
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment.5 We are some-
times still at odds with one another over what this provision means 
and, more concretely, what kinds of laws touching religious interests 
may be deemed compatible with the first amendment.6 A law forbids 
homicide. It provides no exception even when the homicide is an exer-
cise of sincere religious zeal or a ritualistic offering of sacrifice reluc-
tantly committed as a doctrinally required demonstration of faith and 
~upplication. Yet the "conflict" between amendment and law is 
scarcely worth a pause: we do not doubt that the law's determination to 
allow no such exception will meet whatever burden of justification 
~omeone might attempt to suggest is required by the first amendment. 
(We may say, even as the Supreme Court has said, that, "[T]he [First] 
Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom 
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot 
be."7 ) In other instances, however, the burden of reconciling our laws 
with the free exercise clause is not so easily dismissed; e.g., whether 
snake handling can be forbidden as a religious practice,8 whether po-
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
( !947). 
o. The most recent and wdl-pubhcized e:~.ample is the proposal by Senator Helms of North 
Carolina to deny jurisdiction to the federal courts. including the Supreme Court, over any case 
ansing under any state law relating to "voluntary" prayers m the public schools. The notion is 
that each of the fifty state supreme courts should make the final determination whether such activ-
Ity violates the fourteenth amendment. regardless of any opinion by the United States Supreme 
Court whose previous decisions on this subject Senator Helms believes to be mistaken and so 
mischievous that the Supreme Court should be forbidden to review such matters in the future. 
125 CoNG. REc S4128-31 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 125 CoNG. REc. 
54138-57 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms). 
7 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (emphasis added). 
8. Evidently, it may be forbidden See. e.g .• Tennessee v. Pack. 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.), cert. 
Jemed, 424 U.S. 954 (1976). 
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lygamy can be prohibited and monogamy installed as the sole licit kind 
ofmarriage,9 whether ceremonial uses of mild hallucinogens can be the 
subject of suppression, 10 and whether compulsory education beyond 
the eighth grade can be required even for the offspring of disaffected 
sects. 11 
Yet however unruly, difficult, and unwelcome these controversies 
often may be, very few of us would be happier without the first amend-
ment. The Constitution surely would be a lesser document without it. 
Like so much else in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights compels us to 
measure our sense of the fairness of our laws and governmental prac-
tices by imposing a burden of explanation. Not in any sense a 
blueprint of fine detail, it nonetheless lays down certain standards on 
particular subjects deemed to be of sufficient importance to be featured 
in our most fundamental law. Indeed, it is probably not too much to 
say that the Bill of Rights-with all its controversy over its principles of 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, security of one's person and 
home, security of private property from uncompensated appropriation, 
fair trial, and limitations on tolerable punishment-is central to our 
Constitution. Madison and Jefferson surely were right about this gen-
eral matter; it would have been a mistake to leave everything out of 
account. 
It is the remembrance of these things that prompts my introduction 
to this very brief Commentary on the proposed twenty-seventh amend-
ment. For in the end, I have come to believe that approval of this 
amendment provides the most appropriate answer to the same ques-
tions that were deemed sufficient to justify ratification of the earlier and 
equally important amendments that constitute our Bill of Rights. 
Those questions I think to be these three. First, is the subject of the 
amendment of sufficient importance to warrant recognition in the Con-
stitution of the United States? Second, is the particular subject inade-
quately addressed in the Constitution? And third, does the manner in 
which the subject is treated in this amendment fairly compare with the 
essential style of the Bill of Rights itself? These are the questions that, 
9. Apparently, to criminalize polygamy does not violate the free exercise clause; nor does 
the installation of monogamy enact a dominant religious preference in violation of the establi&h· 
ment clause. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 
(1878). 
10. Possibly, they are not. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 
69 (1964). 
II. Evidently, it cannot be so required. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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when answered to our satisfaction in the past, have produced the most 
enduring and the most admirable parts of our Constitution. There is 
little reason to think that they are not now as useful as they always 
have been merely because the proposal at hand is the twenty-seventh 
amendment rather than some other. 
As right as this unstrained approach now seems to me, it is only fair 
to acknowledge that I nonetheless have taken a very long time to reach 
it. When the twenty-seventh amendment was proposed by Congress in 
l 472, I instinctively thought of the matter in quite a different way-that 
until one could nail down every possible interpretation upon which 
reasonable persons might disagree, it was both premature and unpro-
fessional to entertain any opinion about this amendment. In brief, the 
chief question as it then appeared to me was not any of the three above, 
but rather this: precisely what does this amendment mean, ie., exactly 
what results are (or are not) to obtain in each kind of case that might 
plausibly relate to or arise under it? 12 
The quest for clarification became a mild professional interest at the 
12. This brief Commentary qune deliberately does not undertake to provide "still another" 
mterpret.tUon of the twenty-seventh amendment. It does not do so because an approach to the 
'ubJeCt that takes seriously every kind of alleged result imputed to the amendment by those hostile 
tu 1t 1s doomed from the beginning. It m1ght also appear to "protest too much" by gradually 
t>c.:commg buried in an argumentative minutiae. enduring the futility of Sisyphus. Scarcely could 
(>ne conclude an elaborate response to one supposed danger imputed to the amendment than 
.tnother would at once be rolled down the hill to try one's labor again. Because the conjured evils 
of the amendment are no more finite than the imaginations of persons opposed to the basic fair-
m:ss standard of the amendment itself. an approach to the amendment that begins so defensively 
'' bound to be unconvincing and, thereby, to fail. Again, that kind of approach to the first amend-
ment of our Constitution, to the fourth amendment, or to the eighth amendment-each one of 
which the reader is urged seriously to read again-would have left us with the legacy of Alexander 
H.tmliton's preference. i.e., no Bill of Rights at all. At the cutting edge of the current dispute is 
Jlwt very choice: whether to incorporate the enduring value of an important and articulate princi-
ple mto our fundamental law, or to leave our Constitution vacant in a respect that we know leaves 
tt poorer. 
As an example of why I do not believe objections to the proposed twenty-seventh amendment 
generally reflect an adequate understanding of how provisions unfit for a particularized statute 
m..ty nonetheless be entirely fit for a Constitution, it may be helpful to consider at least one princi-
p.il obJeCtiOn. One objection stems from an anxiety that if the twenty-seventh amendment were 
r..tufied, then men could not be made to serve in combat roles unless women were equally subject 
to Identical military service, i.e., as combat troops. Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold 
..tppropnately expressed this concern: 
[Pjrobably the most serious questions in the minds of many persons is that of women in 
combat services in the Armed Forces. And I venture to say that this is really at the heart 
of much of the opposition which has finally arisen. Many persons, rightly or wrongly, 
sec this as a serious threat to the security of the United States. 
Equal R1ghts Amendment Extension: Hearings Bifore the Rouse Subcomm. on Civil and Cons/. 
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beginning, a major distraction somewhat later, and by the fourth year 
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 113 (1977-78) (statement of 
Erwin Griswold). 
Despite the tendency of some to assume that such a result is acceptable (i.e., they ~ee no serious 
probable compromise of the war power even assuming this result were mandated by the twenty-
seventh amendment), many, myself included, do not share that easy confidence. Rumors to the 
contrary notwithstanding, evidently no country deploys women in its combat infantry. Doubts 
regarding the wisdom of doing so are by no means confined to male chauvinist pigs or to anti-
feminists. For a recent review, see Gilder, The Case Against Women in Combat, New York Times 
Magazine, Jan. 28, 1979, at 29. 
But the issue, so far as the twenty-seventh amendment is involved, is not whether under certain 
conditions it might be desirable or even ultimately unavoidable to pursue that course, as indeed it 
might; the issue is whether the twenty-seventh amendment would compel that result regardless of 
a contrary desire by Congress. I am confident that it would not. Equal Rights Amendment Exten· 
sion: Hearings BefOre the House Subcomm. on Civil and Cons/. Rights of the House Comm. 011 ll1e 
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 150 (1977-78) (statement of William W. Van Alstyne). 
It is quite true that one possible construction of the amendment would give colorable basis to a 
claim that even in a wartime draft male combat troops could refuse to serve unless women were 
subject to conscription for identical combat service. (The colorable basis for that claim evidently 
is that insofar as women might not be subject to that form of military service, an "equality of 
rights under the law" must necessarily mean that neither may men be made subject to that form of 
military service.) Even reasonable attention, however, to Supreme Court interpretations of fully 
equivalent provisions elsewhere in our Constitution, construed in light of the special force of the 
several war powers clauses within the Constitution, should settle one's thoughts against the plausi-
bility of that wooden interpretation. 
The first amendment is quite absolute in the expression of its central premise respecting one's 
freedom of speech. Thus, it provides no enumerated list of exceptions to its general command that 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Despite that command, 
however, the first amendment is acknowledged to be subject to construction in light of certain 
enumerated powers of Congress including, most importantly, the war powers. Indeed the amend· 
mentis not read to protect speech in disregard of all other circumstances even when the war power 
·itself is not involved. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Despite the breadth of 
the first amendment's command, in the first modem case in which it was drawn into question Mr. 
Justice Holmes read it as subject to restraints of compelling justification. Thus, he observed that 
"the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a 
theater, and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919). Most pertinently, 
he further observed: 
Id 
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and 
that no Court could regard as protected by any constitutional right. 
The power to prepare for and to engage in war is aggregated from a half-dozen explicit and 
quite special provisions in the Constitution-from the powers vested in Congress in article I, § 8 
(to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules for the government of 
those forces, to declare war), through those vested in the President in article II (as Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States), to that stated in article IV,§ 4 (providing that 
the United States shall protect the states from invasion). Not only are these powers committed to 
the Congress and to the President rather than to the courts, but the principal responsibility re-
specting the enforcement of the twenty-seventh amendment itself is also committed to Congress 
rather than to the courts. Therefore, it is extraordinarily implausible, as well as remarkably unhis-
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(when certitude was becoming even more elusive), virtually a sufficient 
reason for perpetual agnosticism. Only more recently, nearly two years 
after I laid aside this distraction to return to more general interests in 
constitutional law, did it occur to me that the central premise of the 
twenty-seventh amendment is really quite plain and that I had been 
reacting with my characteristic mistrust of any proposal to amend the 
Constitution. It also became quite plain that had equally hostile mis-
trust similarly characterized the disposition of Congress and of the sev-
eral state legislatures between 1789 and 1791, there never could have 
been a sufficient consensus to "risk" the Bill of Rights itself. Most cer-
tainly, there never could have developed the national consensus essen-
tial to the enactment of the only other amendment that in any 
fundamental way compares favorably with the Bill of Rights-the 
fourteenth amendment. 
Indeed, there is scarcely any portion of the original Constitution of 
continuing significance that, as framed, could prevail over a general 
fear that regards a constitution with the same anxiety of an impending 
criminal indictment, to be attacked until such time as a detailed bill of 
particulars should also be produced. Provisions most fit for inclusion 
in a constitution are least appropriate for inclusion in a transient statu-
toncal, to suppose that if the Congress and the President were mutually of the view that the 
msertion of women into combat mfantry was not appropriate to the enforcement of that amend-
ment. but rather, that such a step would senously compromise the related war powers entrusted to 
Congress and to the President, then the Supreme Court would nonetheless presume to "overrule" 
their combined judgment on both matters at once. 
It has been observed by the Court itself that the power to wage war is the power to wage war 
'uccessfully. Lichter v. United States. 334 U.S. 742. 782 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81,93 (1943). A far less defensible treatment of .. equal rights" than a determination to avoid 
tho: deployment of women in combat umts has been sustained in the Supreme Court, even with 
respect to persons set apart exclusively because of their race and made to endure extraordinary 
hardsh1ps. See, e.g., Korematsu v. Umted States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
None of this is to insist that Congress should necessarily exempt women from combatant train-
mg and combatant service, for without doubt there may be eminently reasonable differences of 
opmion about the wisdom or need to do so. This is to say, however. that the twenty-seventh 
.1mendment should not be thought to foreclose that judgment. The most zealous proponents of a 
unisex combat infantry may find th1s outcome galling and even renegade. The most zealous pro-
ponents of absolute free speech. even speech that incites desertion under fire of the enemy, may 
'ometimes find the actual judicial interpretation of the first amendment galling and even rene-
gade. But each, albeit in respect to a d1lferent issue, is equally mistaken on how a constitution is to 
be interpreted if they believe that courts will regard any amendment, or any other part of that 
constitution, as wholly unaffected by the structure and relation of other powers and provisions 
wnhin it. 
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tory code. Each was not in the beginning and cannot even now be 
framed to foreclose the future. 
To agree with this much is not, of course, to counsel at once against 
further reflection. It does, however, very much alter one's perspective 
on the proper objects of that reflection. These objects, in the instance 
of a proposed amendment, are the three substantial questions of consti-
tutional statecraft that have resulted in the defeat of petty or ill-advised 
proposals assembled from some ad hoc distemper. They are also the 
substantial questions of constitutional statecraft that have provided us 
in the past with constitutional progress. In applying them to the pro-
posed twenty-seventh amendment, I believe they firmly operate to 
commend its ratification. The subject of its concern is quite plainly of 
sufficient importance to warrant recognition in our Constitution, it is a 
subject most inadequately addressed elsewhere in that document, and 
the manner in which its central premise is framed compares extremely 
well with the manner that we have found most satisfactory in the past: 
Section I. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
II. A BRIEF GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Since the adoption of the original ten amendments, sixteen addi-
tional amendments have been passed into law. The majority of these, 
however, make only very limited revisions and lay down no very im-
portant principles. They are simply not comparable to the best known 
amendments of the original Bill of Rights. The twelfth, twentieth, 
twenty-second, and twenty-fifth amendments while, of course, not triv-
ial, principally effect adjustments in the selection and terms of office for 
the President and Vice President. The sixteenth amendment merely 
frees the levy of certain income taxes from an apportionment formula 
previously required under article I. The eighteenth amendment "en-
acted" national prohibition-an adventure in abstinence that the 
twenty-first amendment repealed. 
In fact, there are probably only two amendments that compare in 
significance with the original Bill of Rights. The thirteenth amend-
ment, which prohibits slavery, is undoubtedly one of these. Aside from 
its importance, the occasion and necessity for its adoption are instruc-
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tive in two other ways. First, the thirteenth amendment is a permanent 
and sober reminder that until its ratification, human slavery was itself 
accommodated by other provisions within our own Constitution, 13 the 
Bill of Rights notwithstanding. Second, it is also a most helpful re-
minder that the original Bill of Rights was itself by no means perfect, 
that it left several important issues unresolved. 
Slavery was one of these issues. The general protection of most fun-
damental civil liberties from abridgement by the states, not merely 
from abridgement by the national government, was another. 14 An 
amendment addressed to this shortcoming was adopted in 1868. Its 
most important provisions state: 15 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this Article. 
This fourteenth amendment is itself now Ill years old. During that 
time its remarkable and delphic passages-"due process," "equal pro-
tection," "privileges and immunities"-have had an extraordinary ca-
reer. On the one hand, the privileges and immunities clause was 
immediately interpreted by the Supreme Court in a manner virtually 
depriving it of any significance whatever, 16 an interpretation that al-
most surely would have amazed many of its principal sponsors. On the 
other hand, its remaining clauses-the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses-have been construed to include an astonishing assortment 
13. More precisely, although the word "slavery" never appears in the Constitution, it was 
very carefully accommodated and protected throughout the entire document. U.S. CaNST. art. I. 
§ 2. cl. 3 (apportionment of Representatives); U.S. CaNST. art. I. § 9, cis. I & 4 (importation of 
"such persons" guaranteed until 1808; capitation or other direct taxes to be imposed on same 
apportionment formula as Representatives [five "other persons"-meaning slaves-to count as 
three free persons)); U.S. CaNST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. I (constitutional duty of each state to return run-
away slaves); U.S. CaNST. art. V (precluding any amendment prior to 1808 that would alter some 
of these pro-slavery clauses). 
14. The Bill of Rights, of course, was a set of restrictions that operated only upon the United 
States and imposed no limitations upon the states. Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
15. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV. 
16. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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of more particular subjects ranging all the way from laws mandating 
racial apartheid 17 to laws fixing the retail price of milk at nine cents a 
quart18, an interpretation that might likewise have startled many of its 
sponsors. 
The sheer breadth of the fourteenth amendment readily distinguishes 
it from all others enacted since the original Bill of Rights. Indeed, that 
breadth distinguishes the amendment from nearly all of the original 
Bill of Rights as well. Most of these, broad as they are, nonetheless 
focus on identifiable subjects-whether so general a subject as freedom 
of speech or so particularized a subject as the quartering of soldiers. 
The fourteenth amendment is broader by far. It is also, by the same 
breadth, much more indiscriminate. 
In one sense this breadth may well be one of its virtues, quite apart 
from the exhilarating role it creates for the judiciary. The sheer indis-
criminateness of its breadth, however, has also been a large part of its 
greatest vice: an amendment that speaks so broadly to all possible sub-
jects of state action tends, in the same voice, to speak distinctly of none. 
The resulting difficulty has long since become quite evident. Is there 
but one standard of justification that all laws must meet insofar as they 
affect "life, liberty, or property" or produce unequal degrees of "protec-
tion," or are there different kinds of standards that different laws, ad-
dressing different subjects of classification or regulation, must meet? If 
some matters are more important than others, or if some kind of sub-
jects are not to be subordinated to the same kind of regulation or classi-
fication as are other kinds of subjects, how are courts to determine 
which are which when neither the Constitution nor the fourteenth 
amendment itself declares the distinction? Questions of this sort are 
not merely the grist of law school courses in constitutional law. They 
are at the center of judicial perplexityl9 and of our own perplexity as 
well. They are the occasion for the more particular provisions of the 
twenty-seventh amendment. 
There is in our Constitution no identifiable provision directed to the 
specific and recurring tendency to treat men and women unequally. In-
sofar as the fourteenth amendment is said to be such a provision, there 
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled sub silentio in Gayle v. Browder, 352 
u.s. 903 (1956). 
18. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
19. For a single, exquisite example of the difficulty, see the several opinions (covering 137 
pages) in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
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is nothing on the face of the amendment to suggest that the propriety of 
this tendency is of any greater constitutional concern than the acknowl-
edged discretion of legislatures to favor some kinds of business activity 
over other kinds, to distinguish between minors and adults, or to permit 
some to sell land for a larger profit (e.g., for use as a gas station) while 
limiting others to less profitable resales (e.g., for use as a single-family 
dwelling).20 In brief, unlike most of the Bill of Rights, which register a 
concrete solicitude for specific concerns such as freedom of speech or 
religion, there is nothing in our fundamental law concretely commit-
ting us to the determination that "[e]quality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex." 
Actually, the contrary is more nearly true; so far as the Constitution 
itself provides, the sole provision concerned with inequality of treat-
ment related to gender implies a general indifference to the question. 
The nineteenth amendment addresses the issue of gender discrimina-
tion and provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation? 1 
Insofar as this amendment addresses the subject, but solely forbids 
such inequality as to voting, the most sensible inference is that the Con-
stitution is otherwise indifferent to gender-based laws-that all other 
kinds of legal inequalities between men and women are of no greater 
concern than the inequalities that may be imposed to distinguish adults 
from minors, corporations from partnerships, opticians from ophthal-
mologists-and is content to cast all other matters back into the indif-
ferent net of the equal protection clause,22 the "usual last resort of 
constitutional arguments."23 
To be sure, the indifferent generality of the equal protection clause 
can be pressed into service. Indeed, as we well know, it has been 
pressed into service. Since 1970 an unstable line of Supreme Court 
20. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976): Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S 726 ( 1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955): Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
21. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX. 
22. Indeed, this was until quite recently the settled position of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
23. Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200. 208 ( 1927). 
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decisions has forced from that clause a special standard of equal pro-
. tection for the review of laws that treat men and women unequally.24 
By patching together analogies based on the race-inequality laws25 that 
were the particular, specific, and overwhelming object of the fourteenth 
amendment/6 which gender-inequality laws were not,27 the Supreme 
24. The unsteady adjustment of the equal protection clause to gender-related laws com-
menced with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). An effort to provide that case with a suitable post-
hoc rationale was immediately thereafter supplied in Gunther, In Search o/ Evob•ing Doc/nile on a 
Changing Court: A Mode/fora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972), Virtually all 
of the ensuing Supreme Court decisions are noted and reviewed in Ginsburg. Sexual Equall~l' 
Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. I 61. During the current 
term of the Supreme Court, the Court held that a state law exempting women from the possibility 
of having to pay alimony (while subjecting men to that possibility) denies equal protection to men. 
Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979). 
25. The most elaborate effort to perfect this comparison appears in Mr. Justice Brennan'!· 
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 I U.S. 677 (1973). See also Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, S CaL 
3d I, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. (1971). Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
26. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873): 
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be 
called history ... ; [that] no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose 
found in [the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and 
without which none of them would have been even suggested; ... the protection of the 
newly made freemen and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exer-
cised unlimited dominion over him. 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879): 
It was in view of these considerations the 14th Amendment was framed and adopted. It 
was designed to assure [black people] the enjoyment of all the civil right$ that under the 
law are enjoyed by white persons .... 
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879): 
One great purpose of these Amendments was to raise the colored race . . . into perfect 
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States. They 
were intended to take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or color. 
27. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (state restriction of women 
from the practice of law sustained); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (state 
restriction of women from voting sustained). In neither case did plaintiff press the equal protec-
tion issue with vigor, but relied principally upon the "privileges and immunities" clause, just as 
the plaintiffs had done in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The overall 
evidence does not so much suggest that women were uniquely or even specially disfavored vis-a-
vis other kinds of plaintiffs seeking relief under the equal protection clause as it does suggest that 
the clause was generally regarded to impose very little restriction on the police powers of the states 
except in regard to the civil rights of racial minorities. See text accompanying note 2 I supra. See 
also Mt:ndelson, ERA, The Supreme Court, and Allegations o/ Gender Bias, 44 Mo. L. Rev. I 
(1979). The subject is additionally complicated, however, insofar as§ 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment explicitly provides that states may lump women together with criminals and with males 
under the age of twenty-one for purposes of disfranchisement without risking any loss of represen-
tation in Congress as otherwise contemplated by that section. q: Richardson v. Ramirez, 4 I 8 
U.S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles 
does not violate the equal protection clause). 
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Court has to that extent supplied by case law what we mutually under-
stand the Constitution itself to not supply: a distinct constitutional 
boundary expressly directed to this independently important subject. 
How satisfactory is the jerry-rigged, judicially improvised substitute? 
Surely, "not very," from almost everyone's point of view. Instead of a 
properly framed and duly ratified express provision appropriately ad-
dressed to this basic and recurring issue, we have enormously prolix 
opinions from a badly divided Court struggling to explain why laws 
that weigh unequally upon men and women involve a "quasi-suspect" 
classification subject to a "middle tier scrutiny" under the fourteenth 
amendment28-an amendment not framed to deal with this issue in any 
particular fashion, nor aided by anything in the original Bill ofRights29 
or any other part of the Constitution directed to the issue; an amend-
ment bogged down in judicial disagreement whether the Court has any 
proper business in struggling so hard to supply what the Constitution 
does not provide. 
In brief, the problem with the fourteenth amendment as an adequate 
substitute for the twenty-seventh amendment is basically the problem 
of "The Emperor's New Clothes." On the Court's part, it may be an 
entirely honorable gesture to avoid leaving the subject nearly naked. 
On our part, it is entirely unworthy. The principle that "[e]quality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex" is an important one. It well 
warrants an express place in our Constitution.30 That place is not 
20. For an recent example of a federal district court"s exhaustive (and exhausting) recapitula-
uon (once again) of these matters. in which these inelegant phrases appear, see Felix v. Milliken, 
463 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
29. As the Court has noted, "The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth 
Am~ndment. becau~e it also collides with the principles of the First [Amendment], is much more 
defimt~ than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved." West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 639 (1943). 
30. An additional advantage reasonably to be expected from ratification of the twenty-sev-
enth amendment 1s a disentanglement of future analyses of gender-related laws from the very 
1mperf~ct and often confusmg comparison currently made with race-related laws-an entangle-
ment currently encouraged by their common treatment under the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Identification of gender-related laws to a separate constitutional provi-
'!On ~hould provide the basis for acknowledgment of distinctions that current "squeezings" from 
other constitutional provisions tend to disallow or. at least, to make exceedingly awkward. 
On~ such issue concerns "separate but equal" facilities, or "separate but equivalent" opportuni-
tle>. Such a doctrine, offered in JUStification of laws mandating racial apartheid, is utterly unac-
ceptable under the equal protection clause. See, e.g.. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954); o1·erru/ing sub silentio Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
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properly filled by a mere cluster of unruly cases discoverable by 
"Shepardizing" a fragment of the fourteenth amendment. 
III. THE TIMELINESS OF APPROVAL 
The twenty-seventh amendment is but a few votes short of approval, 
principally for reasons of the very same kind that left the original Con-
stitution without any Bill of Rights at all-reasons of timidity and fear 
that had they finally controlled the outcome of the Bill of Rights, would 
also have spelled its defeat. Ironically, insofar as the amendment is 
537 (1896). Governmental actions placing a cordon sanitaire (or "quarantine line") around the 
lives of black Americans in the public sector and mandating an equivalent exclusion in the private 
sector, see, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), were the unworthy successors of 
the more infamous Black Codes in the South and were the legal deposit of a more gentile racism 
in the North. SeeR. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW (-). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The tendency to maintain separate bathroom facilities, or even different athletic programs for 
men and women, however, need not necessarily and may not ordinarily rest on sentiments of 
animosity or fear by either side, and is not by any means either deliberately or inadvertently 
disparaging of a full and genuine "equality of rights." That particular facilities may very well not 
be so arranged-e.g., on buses and on airlines the self-same washroom is alternatively used by 
men and women alike-is very far from the conclusion that whenever such facilities are provided, 
someone is being denied an "equality of rights" on account of sex. To the contrary, in a variety of 
circumstances the most genuine realization of such equality of rights may be fulfilled neither in a 
unisex program nor in gender-segregated but identical programs, but rather in gender-responsive 
equivalent programs. A single example may be helpful. 
If a public school provides but a single varsity sport and that sport is football for which boys 
and girls are all "equally" welcome to try out, the de facto consequence surely must be that all or 
all but a few positions will be held by boys; girls will be foreseeably disadvantaged because of 
gender. As well, if the same school provides "separate but equal" football teams as its 5ole orga-
nized athletic opportunity, surely the "equality of rights" thus provided to girls is likely to be 
regarded as more derisive than genuine. When the normal range of both interests and abilities 
characteristically differs, an accommodation of those differences in gender-specific ways need not 
require mere "stereotypes" nor disparage the skill or competitive excellence of either men or wo-
men, but may approximate a fuller "equality of rights" than any plausible alternative consistent 
with providing any kind of athletic program whatever. It is not supposed that the twenty-seventh 
amendment forbids such programs. Neither should it be supposed that the validity of such pro-
grams, i.e., whether they provide an "equality of rights," would be examined under the false light 
of racial analogy, e.g., whether such a gender-based program may be compared with a program 
that provides two football teams, one for whites only and the other for blacks only, or that pro-
vides two different kinds of teams, football for blacks only and tennis for whites only. Rather, the 
advantage of the twenty-seventh amendment is to avoid this kind of comparison by disentangling 
the consideration of gender-related arrangements from the frequently false analogy of the race 
cases to which they are currently tied by fourteenth amendment analysis alone. In this respect, the 
twenty-seventh amendment is not only an idea whose time has come, but also an amendment 
whose ratification should prove positively helpful. 
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now at risk, that risk arises not because the amendment has received 
too little attention, but because it has received too much attention. Had 
the language of the first amendment or of the fourth amendment or of 
the fifth amendment been parsed, worried over, and scrutinized for 
conceivable flaws to the same repetitive extent that has hostilely char-
acterized the protracted seven-year review of the twenty-seventh 
amendment, it almost certainly would have produced such a confused 
welter of differing explanations and interpretations that by sheer attri-
tion would have destroyed the whole enterprise-the same ennervating 
ennui that threatens this amendment. 
Most certainly, there are margins of ambiguity at the edges of this 
amendment. There are also the suggestions of certain partisans, both 
those in favor of and opposed to the amendment, who confuse the basic 
issue by reading it with such wooden disregard as to forget that it is a 
provision meant for a constitution rather than an internal revenue 
code. Both are mistaken insofar as they suppose that courts will regard 
any amendment or any other part of the Constitution with the same 
insensibility as a procrustean bed. No conscientious state legislator 
even reasonably familiar with the lack of rigidity that has characterized 
Supreme Court interpretations of other amendments should entertain 
concern that this amendment somehow might be treated differently, 
i.e., that it will uniquely demand a rigidity of construction wholly in-
different to considerations of common sense. 
Frankly, legislators who nonetheless wish for greater refinements 
and more detailed elaborations in this amendment unfairly ask for 
more articulation than constitutional principles can ever provide. They 
also ask for more than we have previously found acceptable in other 
important subjects charged with at least as much controversy as this 
one, and for an elaboration that is even less likely to secure consensus 
the more nearly it is made to resemble an administrative regulation. 
To embark all over again, or to recast this amendment in an attempt to 
list some factors or circumstances that might govern its meaning in 
each possibly doubtful case, is plainly a misplaced enterprise. 
The questions that now should be sufficient to answer are the same 
questions that were sufficient to answer in the past. First, is not the 
principle articulated in this proposed amendment unexceptional and 
worthy of the Constitution? Second, is it not preferable to establish 
dearly this principle in our Constitution than to rely upon the awkward 
means by which legislatures and courts have attempted to develop 
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cumbersome substitutes from the bare bones of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the fifth amendment,31 and the mere shadows of other clauses in 
the Constitution? Third, is it not true that the manner in which the 
proposed amendment addresses "equality of rights under the law" 
compares very favorably with the manner in which other vital subjects 
have been similarly addressed in the Constitution? 
So very close to ratification are we, and so very far from any reason-
able likelihood that any other framing of the principle would be supe-
rior, that we need to be much less timorous and much more satisfied in 
this accomplishment. Indeed, how strange people should feel some 
years hence if the best they can say of their contributions to our funda-
mental law is that they assisted in the defeat of a constitutional princi-
ple that proclaims: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex." 
31. According to its own terms, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment h; 
not applicable to acts of Congress. The fifth amendment has no equal protection clause; nor does 
anything else therein look even vaguely suitable as a textual substitute. Nevertheless, the fifth 
amendment has been construed to limit Congress in the same manner as the states are limited by 
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. See Karst, Tlze F(/ilz Amendmmt's Guarantee 
of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977). 
